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The objective of this research is to examine the level and effect of voluntary disclosure and 
the earnings quality on cost of equity capital of listed manufacturing company in 
Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2008. This study uses secondary data from the annual 
reports of 75 manufacturing firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2008. We 
use multiple regressions to test hypotheses. We find that the average of voluntary 
disclosure is only 29.7%, which indicates that firms’ disclosure in the annual report is still 
low. The result also shows that the level of voluntary disclosure, in contrary to expectation, 
has positive and significant effect on cost of equity capital. We find some evidences that 




Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh tingkat pengungkapan sukarela 
dan kualitas laba terhadap cost of equity capital pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar 
di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2008. Penelitian ini dilakukan pada 75 perusahaan yang 
menjadi sampel penelitian. Hipotesis penelitian diuji menggunakan regresi linier berganda. 
Hasil penilaian atas indeks pengungkapan sukarela menunjukkan rata-rata indeks 
pengungkapan sukarela hanya 29.7% sehingga dapat disimpulkan bahwa tingkat 
pengungkapan sukarela dalam laporan tahunan perusahaan masih rendah. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukkan bahwa tingkat pengungkapan sukarela, berbeda dengan dugaan, mempunyai 
pengaruh positif signifikan terhadap biaya modal ekuitas. Ditemukan juga bukti bahwa 
kualitas laba dapat menurunkan biaya modal ekuitas. 
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1. Research Background 
Information on financial statements and annual reports are the important sources of 
information for the parties outside the company in the decision making process. The extent 
to which information can be obtained by shareholders depends on the extent of firms’ 
transparency and disclosure. In 2006, Bapepam-LK had issued guidance about information 
that must be disclosed on annual reports. The information disclosed in annual reports 
should follow this mandatory disclosure and may also include additional voluntary 
disclosure. 
Nuryaman (2009) suggests that disclosure of information will provide a stimulus 
for economic growth as the effect of capital market efficiency. Several studies also 
conclude that voluntary disclosure is useful to reduce the information gap in the capital 
market so that investors believe the shares in the capital market transactions are traded at 
reasonable price. This investors’ confidence will then be followed by an increase in stock 
liquidity (Jiambalvo, 1996) and decrease in cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997). Cost of 
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equity capital is associated with investment risk in the company's stock. Low level of 
disclosure usually causes a high risk premium information and higher disclosure which 
will cause a lower risk premium. Previous studies have examined the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure on the cost of equity capital, including Botosan (1997), Khomsiyah 
and Susanti (2003), Juniarti and Yunita (2003), Maysar (2008), and Francis et al (2008) 
who find negative relationship between level of disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
Earnings are important for users of financial statements, especially those who use 
financial statements for the purpose of contract and investment decision making. In the 
perspective of investment decision making, earnings are the important information for 
investors to comprehend the quality of earnings to reduce the risk of information. On the 
other hand, management has the discretion regarding accounting policies in the preparation 
of financial statements, which can be used to achieve certain objectives. This discretion 
can be used as earnings management tool. According to Scott (2012), earnings 
management is the choice by a manager of accounting choice, or actions affecting 
earnings, so as to achieve some specific reported earnings objective. 
The existence of opportunistic earnings management practices indicates a low 
quality of earnings. Dechow et al. (1996) finds firms sanctioned by the SEC (Securities 
Exchange Commission) due to alleged earnings manipulation has higher cost of capital. 
Utami (2005) also finds that higher levels of earnings management (measured by 
discretionary accruals) are also related to higher cost of equity capital. There are several 
cases of opportunistic earnings management in Indonesia; for example, misstated financial 
statements of PT Kimia Farma Tbk. and PT Indofarma Tbk. 
Management usually uses accruals to manage earnings, hence several studies use 
accruals quality to measure earnings quality. Francis et al. (2005) find that lower accruals 
quality is associated with higher cost of equity capital. Furthermore, Francis et al. (2008) 
use four proxies to measure the quality of earnings: accruals quality, earnings variability, 
absolute abnormal accruals, and the common factor of all those three earnings quality 
proxies. They conclude that higher earnings quality reduces the cost of equity capital. 
This study is intended to extend Francis et al (2008) to Indonesian etting. Based on 
literature review, there are no studies in Indonesia that include both voluntary disclosure 
and earnings quality and examine the effect on cost of equity, and also use several 
measures of earnings quality simultaneously. We use several proxies to measure earnings 
quality in order to generalize our results and reduce measurement error (Chen et al., 2011). 
According to Strobl (2008), the extent of earnings manipulation is related to the 
state of the economy. This relationship is determined by the firm’s earnings profile. He 
suggests that firms whose earnings are more strongly correlated with the market during 
periods of economic expansion have a stronger incentive to overstate earnings during 
periods of recession, and vice versa. The reason behind this is that a low correlation with 
the market makes it more difficult for investors to gather information about the firm’s 
earnings from other sources (such as accounting statements released by other firms). It 
means that the firm's reported earnings have a greater effect on its stock price. A favorable 
earnings number leads to a significantly higher price. Thus, the managers benefit most 
from overstating firm’s performance. On the other hand, if the firm's earnings have high 
correlation with the market, investors gain little additional information from the firm's 
report and the manager has therefore little incentive to manipulate firm's performance. 
There is also empirical evidence from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and non crisis period 
that provides some evidences that managers engaged in more earnings management during 
the crisis period (Saleh and Ahmed, 2005; Ahmed et al., 2008). There is still limited study 
examining level of voluntary disclosure as well as the effect of voluntary disclosure and 
earnings quality on cost of equity during 2008 global financial crisis. 
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We choose only one industry, following Botosan (1997) argument to limit the 
sample to one year and one industry to maximize statistical power. Botosan (1997) argues 
that different industries display different patterns of disclosure. Using different disclosure 
measures for firms in different industries necessitates a within industry analysis, which 
results in smaller intra-industry samples. Hence, this study chooses to select firms in one 
industry for which the same disclosure measure is expected to be appropriate.  
 
2. Research Methods 
The sample of this manufacturing firms study are listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in year 2008. This study limits the analysis to one year because according to 
Botosan (1997) firms' disclosure policies appear to remain relatively constant over time. 
Hence, this study chooses to increase sample size by adding cross-section observations 
instead of increasing observations over time. Year 2008 is chosen because there was global 
financial crisis during that year. The motivation for this is based on the observation that 
most of the extant literature on the effect of voluntary disclosure and earnings quality on 
cost of equity are in non crisis period. 
We develop following research models to test above hypotheses
1
:  
COEt = 0 + 1 DISCLt + 2 ACCRQt + 3 EARNV+ 4 ABNACt + 6 SIZEt  + 7 BMt + 
t  (1) 
COEt = 0 + 1 DISCLt + 5 FACTORt + 6 SIZEt + 7 BMt + t  (2) 
Cost of Equity Capital (COE)  
Cost of equity capital is measured using CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
Botosan (1997) and several other studies suggest EBO residual income model (Edward 
Bell Ohlson) is better to estimate the cost of capital. We do not use this method due to 
unavailable data regarding earnings forecast. CAPM is calculated using the formula below:  
COE = Rft +  RP (3)  
COE : cost of equity capital 
Rf : risk free rate (average interest rate of SBI from January to December 2008)  
Rp : risk premium, obtained from www.damodaran.com (accessed on February 6, 2010)  
  : beta is obtained using market model by regressing firms stock returns with market 
return (using weekly return from January to December 2008)  
Voluntary Disclosure (DISCL)  
Checklist to calculate voluntary disclosures in annual reports is developed based on 
Widyastuti (2010), Nuryaman (2009), Francis et al. (2008), Botosan (1997), Meek et al. 
(1995), Chow and Wong- Boren (1987), Buzby (1975), Singhvi and Desai (1971). This 
checklist is then compared to the list of mandatory disclosures based on Decree of the 
Chairman of the Capital Market Supervisory Agency and Financial Institution Number: 
KEP-134/BL/2006 December 7, 2006. These mandatory disclosures are excluded from the 
checklist.  





DISCL                                            (4) 
DISCL : voluntary disclosure 
1
We use 2 research models which separate FACTOR from other variables of earnings quality, because of 
multicollinearity between those variables.
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Q: total of disclosed items  
S : total of items in checklist                                                   
 
Earnings Quality  
Following Francis et al(2008), we use four earnings quality proxies: accrual quality 
(ACCRQ), earnings variability (EARNV), absolute abnormal accruals (ABNACCR), and 
common factor from those three proxies (FACTOR).  
The first measurement of Accruals Quality (ACCRQ) is calculated with the 
formula as follows:  
TACj,t = a0 + a1 CFOj,t-1 + a2 CFOj,t + a3 CFOj,t+1 + a4 REVj,t + a5 PPEj,t + vj,t (5) 
TAC : Total current accrual  
CFO : Cash flows from operating activities 
REV : Changes in revenue 
PPE : Gross property, plant, and equipment 
All variables are deflated by average total assets in year t. Accruals quality is 
measured by standard deviation of residual values (vj,t) for 5 years (2004-2008).  
The second measurement earnings variability (EARNVAR) is measured by standard 
deviation of net income before extraordinary items are divided by total assets for 5 years 
(2004-2008). Higher earnings variability indicates lower earnings quality. 
The third measurement is absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABNAC) calculated 


















+  j,t (6) 
We use average value of absolute abnormal accruals for 5 years (2004 to 2008).  
The last measure of earnings quality is Common Factor [Earning Quality] 
(FACTOR) based on above earnings quality proxies. Higher value of the common factor 
(earnings quality) indicates lower quality of earnings.  
2.1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Samples for this study are selected based on the following criteria: 1) firms in 
manufacturing industry, 2) never delisted during 2003-2009, 3) actively traded, 4) have 
2008 annual report, and 5) all data needed for this research are available. Based on the 
sample selection criteria, the results of sample selection process are presented in Table 1.    
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Process  
Criteria Total 
Firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2008  399 
Non-manufacturing firms (260) 
Total manufacturing firms 139 
Annual report not available (27) 
Delisted (1) 







This study uses secondary data of annual report, annual financial statements, daily 
stock price, market index, and SBI rate, collected from PRPM (Pusat Referensi Pasar 




3. Result and Discussion 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in this study. Average cost 
of equity capital is 0.197.  The average level of voluntary disclosure is still low (only 
29,7%). Proxy for earnings quality in this study uses the Accrual Quality, Earnings 
Variability, Absolute Abnormal Accrual, and Common Factors of the three earnings 
quality proxies. There is considerable variation in earnings quality (based on standard 
deviation), especially on common factor measures. This indicates that the level of earnings 
quality in our samples is quite vary. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of each 
voluntary disclosure category. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Maximum Minimum Mean Median 
Std.
Deviation
COE 0.230 0.184 0.197 0.194 0.011 
DISCL 0.573 0.053 0.297 0.280 0.120 
ACCRQ 0.289 0.011 0.081 0.060 0.072 
EARNV 0.472 0.002 0.075 0.040 0.109 
ABNAC 0.490 0.059 0.195 0.159 0.102 
FACTOR 2.899 -1.027 -0.018 -0.363 0.937 
SIZE 
(Rp million) 
59,514 9 3,203.93 320 9,694.43 
BM 5.748 -2.770 1.427 1.186 1.477 
Note: COE: cost of equity capital, DISCL: voluntary disclosure, ACCRQ: accruals quality, 
EARNV: earnings variability, ABNAC: absolute abnormal accrual, FACTOR: common 
factor [earnings quality], SIZE: market capitalization, BM: book-to-market.  
Based on Table 3, we can see that there is a minimum score of 0 of non-financial 
highlight, management’s discussion and analysis of financial performance, employee 
information, research and development activities, as well as value-added reporting. These 
findings suggest that there is a tendency not to disclose firm’s information related to those 
items. Firms may have consideration not to disclose certain types of information because 
they think the benefit from disclosure is not greater than cost incurred. In addition, 
management may want to keep confidential information from its competitors, if it was 
disclosed, it could weakened firm’s position in business competition. On the other hand, 
category of general information has the highest score compared to other categories.  Below 
is the analysis of each category of voluntary disclosures: 
3.1. General Information  
With the average score of 45%, this category is the first, i.e. has the highest score. 
In this category, the disclosure item of the description of actions taken in this year to 
achieve company’s goals has the highest score (96%) compared to any other items. This 
item can be used by the company to show their stakeholders that firms have done many 
things to achieve companies’ goals. In this category, item of disclosure/description of the 
objective and strategy related to social aspects of corporate strategy has the lowest score 
than other disclosures. Firms are still paying little attention on social aspects of corporate 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure Categories  
Voluntary Disclosure Categories Maximum Minimum Range Mean 
General Information 0,96 0,09 0,87 0,45 
Non Financial Highlights 0,79 0,00 0,79 0,16 
Management's Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Performance 
0,40 0,00 0,40 0,22 
Information About Business Projections and 
Prospects 
0,65 0,03 0,63 0,26 
Employee Information 0,59 0,00 0,59 0,19 
Corporate Governance Information 0,63 0,01 0,61 0,27 
Research and Development Activities 0,28 0,00 0,28 0,12 
Capital Market Data 0,91 0,01 0,89 0,43 
Value-added reporting 0,36 0,00 0,36 0,22 
3.2.  Non Financial Highlights
The average score of non-financial disclosure is only 16%. This shows the 
companies' awareness to disclose information about non-financial summary is still 
low. Explanation regarding impact of inflation on the results of the present and or future 
has the highest score of 79%. This information may be disclosed so that investors can 
analyze firms’ performance by also considering the effect of inflation on performance.  In 
this category, the disclosure items of this year's new orders numbers are not disclosed at 
all. It may indicate that firms do not think this information as an important thing or 
disclosure of new order can disclose confidential information to firms’ competitors.  
3.3. Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Performance
Average score for this category is 22%, and the highest score is for item 
distribution description (description of firm’s marketing network of goods and services). 
This information is revealed the most because firms will want to demonstrate to investors 
that they have marketing network of goods and services that play an important role in 
achieving corporate revenue target. The existence of marketing network may also indicate 
that firms have a vast market for their products and services. In this category, there is a 
disclosure item that no firm discloses it, which is the information about costs into fixed and 
variable components. Firms may not have such information available in their accounting 
information system or  firms want to keep it confidential from their competitors.  
3.4. Information about Projections and Business Prospects
This category has an average score of 26%. Items of technological factors affecting 
business in the future have the highest score of 65%. This item is disclosed to demonstrate 
that technology is one important factor for the company. In this information age, 
technology is very important for firms’ survival. It will also provide firms additional 
advantage to compete with competitors. Disclosure with the lowest score is projection of 
net income in the future (in the segment information) (for companies with multi-segment, 
the disclosure is for each segment) of only 3%. Firms are usually reluctant to disclose 
information about projection, because failure to achieve this projection will trigger 
investors’ negative reaction. 
3.5.Employee Information
For this category, the average score is only 19%. Information regarding employee 
relationship with firm has the highest score of 59%. This is one of the informations that 
firm would like to disclose to show investors that keeping good relationship with its 
employees is an important matter. While items of details of employees by geographic area 
are not disclosed by all firms, some firms do disclose information of employees by line of 
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business (33%). This indicates that firms are more concerned with the disclosure of 
employees by line of business, instead of by geographic area.  
3.6. Information and Corporate Governance
With the average score of 27%, this category is ranked third of the highest score. 
Statement on product standards or regulations related to products has the highest score of 
63%. This is because the company wants to demonstrate to investors that the standard of a 
product that follows is one important factor for successful sales of products. Standards will 
indicate the quality of a product itself. By having products that have already followed the 
standards will help firms to increase their sales volume. In this category, the lowest score is 
the statement about the obligations of shareholders.  
3.7. Research and Development Activities
Score of items related to firm's policy on R & D activities is the highest 
(28%). Benefits of disclosure of research and development can help companies to manage 
outsiders’ expectations, especially investors, about the firm’s performance in the 
future. This information may convince investors that firms consider R&D as an important 
strategy and able to engage in many research and development carried out which will result 
in profit, revealing many research and development work, comply with such restrictions 
and can cause an accurate stock price. In this category, there is a disclosure item that is not 
disclosed at all (forecast expenditure for R & D activities). This is because firms do not 
want to let their competitors know their planned R&D activities.   
3.8. Capital Market Data 
Average for category capital market data is the second highest (43%). In this 
category, the highest score is for percentage of institutional shareholders (both institutional 
domestic and foreign), which is 91%.  The presence of high institutional ownership may 
provide a signal to investors regarding firms’ strong external control. According to the 
Daily and Dollinger (1992), a company owned by institutional tends to be larger in size 
and lower bankruptcy rates than the family-controlled firm. Disclosure of percentage of 
family shareholders has the lowest score of 0.01 because the company may know that there 
is a negative view of investors if a company is mostly owned by the family.  
3.9. Value-Added Reporting
Average score for this category is only 22%. Disclosure with highest score in this 
category is for statements regarding the firm's policy on value-added of 36%. With the 
rapid change in the business world, there is also a change in the company, which has 
become a value-oriented and no longer as a profit-oriented. Firms want to demonstrate to 
investors that the company's policies will maximize the value of the firm. In this category, 
there is a disclosure item which is not disclosed (ratio of value added or value-added 
statement). It is probably because this type of ratio and statement is not a familiar concept 
to the firm.  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure of firms in each sub 
industry of manufacturing industry. Highest level of voluntary disclosure is in Automotive 
and Components (57.3%), while the lowest is in sub industry Textile Garment of 5.3%. 
Although the highest level of voluntary disclosure is in Automotive and Component, the 
highest average is in Tobacco Manufacturer, which consists of two samples of big firms 
(Bentoel International Investama and HM Sampoerna Tbk ) with high level of voluntary 
disclosure. Comparing the average in each industry to total average of all samples of 
30.6%, there are 9 sub industries with scores below average. These are Ceramic, Glass, 
Porcelain, Metal and Allied Products, Chemical, Plastic and Packaging; Animal Feed, Pulp 
and Paper, Textile Garment, Food and Beverages; and Houseware. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure for Each Sub Industry 
Sub Industry N Maximum Minimum Range Mean 
Cement 3 0.507 0.387 0.120 0.431 
Ceramics, Glass, 
Porcelain 
3 0.347 0.213 0.133 0.284 
Metal and Allied 
Product 
7 0.320 0.147 0.173 0.223 
Chemicals 6 0.413 0.133 0.280 0.258 
Plastics &Packaging 5 0.280 0.147 0.133 0.221 
Animal Feed 3 0.347 0.147 0.200 0.253 
Wood Industries 2 0.387 0.360 0.027 0.373 
Pulp & Papper 3 0.360 0.160 0.200 0.244 
Automotive and 
Components 
8 0.573 0.173 0.400 0.317 
Textile Garment 9 0.373 0.053 0.320 0.240 
Food and Beverages 11 0.533 0.147 0.387 0.303 
Tobacco 
Manufacturer 
2 0.507 0.507 0.000 0.507 
Pharmaceuticals 6 0.507 0.120 0.387 0.396 
Cosmetisc and 
Household 
2 0.520 0.240 0.280 0.380 
Houseware 3 0.387 0.147 0.240 0.293 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 5. Based on result in Table 5
2
, adjusted R 
Square of model 1 is 24%, while adjusted R Square of model 2 is slightly higher (25.6%). 
Both models are highly significant at 1%. It means that significant proportion of variance 
in the dependent variable is explained by the linear combination of the independent 
variables, i.e. the model is fit. 
Model 1 and model 2 are only different in terms of earnings quality measure. 
Model 2 uses only one measure, which is a common factor [earning quality], whereas 
Model 1 includes 3 individual measures of earnings quality. Higher adjusted R Square of 
Model 2 indicates that earnings quality measured using common factor is a better measure 
of earnings quality to test the effect of earnings quality on cost of equity capital. 
Results in Table 5 for model 1 show that, contrary to our prediction, the level of 
voluntary disclosure has significant positive effect on cost of equity capital (hypothesis 1 is 
not accepted). Although firms already provide voluntary information this does not lower 
the cost of equity capital, but instead it increase cost of equity capital. This result is 
different from previous studies (Botosan, 1997; Komalasari and Baridwan, 2001; Juniarti 
and Yunita, 2003; Khomsiyah and Susanti, 2003; Maysar, 2008) which find negative and 










2 This model has satisfied OLS classical assumption (homoscedasticity, no multicollinearity, no autocorrelation)  
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Table 5. Regression Results
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 
Coef. t-stat Sig Coef. t-stat Sig 
C 0.153 14.739 0.000*** 0.159 16.628 0.000***
DISCL 0.023 1.861 0.034** 0.026 2.300 0.012** 
FACTOR    0.004 2.913 0.003***
ACCRQ 0.034 1.310 0.097*    
EARNV 0.011 0.895 0.374    
ABNAC 0.001 0.092 0.927    
SIZE 0.002 2.701 0.005*** 0.002 2.646 0.005***
BM 0.003 3.386 0.000*** 0.003 3.363 0.000***
F-Stat 4.899   7.369   
Sig 0.000***   0.000***   
Adj. R 
Square 
0.240   0.256   
COE: cost of equity capital, DISCL: voluntary disclosure, ACCRQ: accruals quality, EARNV: earnings 
variability, ABNAC: absolute abnormal accrual, FACTOR: common factor [earnings quality], SIZE: market 
capitalization, BM: book-to-market.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%  
 
Investors may find that it is difficult to obtain truly significant information among 
the volumious of information in the annual report. Miller (2010) find that more complex 
filings (i.e. longer and less readable) are associated with lower overall investors’ trading. 
More disclosure may not necessarily aid investors if it is more costly for them to extract 
useful information from the larger and more complex disclosures (Bloomfield, 2002 in 
Miller, 2010). In addition expanded disclosure might enable investors to analyze firm more 
comprehensive and based on that evaluation they may conclude that firm is riskier. The 
complexity (length and readability) and extended disclosure may drive the investors to ask 
for higher return and this will increase cost of equity capital. 
This positive relationship may also due to the global financial crisis in year 2008. 
Choi et al. (2011) study the Asian Þnancial crisis in nine Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) and 
they find the increased use of opportunistic earnings management. Management might 
increase voluntary disclosure to conceal this opportunistic earnings management. Baginski 
et al. (2011) suggest that “incentives to engage in quality voluntary disclosure while 
committing fraud remain strong.” 
The results in Table 5 show that accruals quality in model 1 and common factor 
variables [earnings quality] in model 2 has significant and positive effect on cost of equity 
capital (hypothesis 2 is not rejected), which means that lower earnings quality will increase 
firm’s cost of equity capital. This finding is consistent with previous studies. Gode and 
Mohanram (2001) use earnings variance as an inverse measure of earnings quality, and 
find that higher earnings variance result in higher cost of equity capital. Francis et al. 
(2005) find that firms with poor accruals quality have higher cost of equity. Aboody et al. 
(2005) and Francis et al. (2008) also find that earnings quality has negative relationship 
with cost of equity capital. In Indonesia, Utami (2005) also find evidence that earnings 
management has a positive effect on the cost of equity capital. 
Subramanyam (1996) argue that earnings is a measure of firm performance, usually 
used as an input for users of financial statement for decision making. Due to agency 
conflict, management may be motivated to engage in opportunistic earnings management 
to maximize his/her utility. Opportunistic earnings management will bias reported 
earnings. Investors may have foresee this earnings misreporting and consider that condition 
as information risk. Less informed investors (due to lower earnings quality) will perceived 
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higher risk of information compared to more informed investor. Higher information risk 
will increase investors’ required rate of return and eventually increase cost of equity 
capital. 
Results also show that variable earnings variability and absolute abnormal accruals 
do not have significant impact on cost of equity capital (hypotheses 2b and 2c is rejected). 
Based on this results, we conclude that it might be better to measure earnings quality using 
accruals quality or the combination of several earnings quality variables such as captured 
in common factor [earnings quality].  
Market capitalization (SIZE) also has significant positive effect on cost of equity 
capital. This finding is not consistent with Botosan (1997) which find negative association 
of market capitalization and cost of equity capital. Larger companies are more complex 
than smaller ones. This complexity may increase company risk, which resulted in higher 
cost of equity capital. Book-to-market has significant and positive impact on cost of equity 
capital, consistent with Francis et al(2008).  
For sensitivity analysis, we re-run the model by including only one measure of 
earnings quality. From Table 6 we can see that the adjusted R square of 3 models in this 
sensitivity analysis is lower than that of Model 2. Compare to Model 1 in the main 
analysis, only Model 4 in the sensitivity analysis has higher adjusted R square. This 
findings indicate that earnings quality measured using common factor is the better measure 
and among 3 individual earnings quality measures the accrual quality is the finer measure. 
The results in Table 6 show consistent result with main models. Disclosure has 
significant positive effect on cost of equity capital. Each measure of earnings quality 
(accruals quality, earnings variability, and absolute abnormal accruals) has significant and 
positive effect on cost of equity capital. This result suggests that higher earnings quality 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We find that voluntary disclosures in annual reports of manufacturing firms in 2008 
is still very low. On average, voluntary disclosure level is only 29.7%. Highest score is in 
category of general information of 45%. There are several categories that are not disclosed 
at all, which are non-financial highlights, management discussion and analysis of financial 
performance, employee information, research and development activities, and value-added 
reporting. Management needs to assess their current level of voluntary disclosure, and 
decide  which catagory they should add additional voluntary information, that can help 
investors to better understand and assess the company. 
Contrary to our prediction, we do not find significant negative effect of voluntary 
disclosures on cost of equity capital. We even find evidence of positive relationship. This 
finding is different from Botosan (1997), Komalasari and Baridwan (2001), Juniarti and 
Yunita (2003), Khomsiyah and Susanti (2003), and Maysar (2008), which find significant 
negative association between voluntary disclosure and cost of equity capital. 
This positive relationship may occur due to investors may find that it is difficult to 
obtain truly significant information among the volumious of information in the annual 
report or more extensive disclosures could be used by investors to conduct more 
comprehensive evaluation of the company, which enable them to asses firms’ risks better. 
These arguments might explain why investors charge higher cost of equity capital for 
increased voluntary disclosure. We also find that only corporate governance information 
category of voluntary disclosure that has positive and significant effect on cost of capital. 
Other categories of voluntary disclosure do not have significant effect. 
There are evidences that earning quality has significant positive influence on cost 
of equity capital, if we use common factor [earnings quality] and accruals quality as 
earnings quality measures. This indicates that lower earnings quality results in higher cost 
of equity capital. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Gode and Mohanram, 
2001; Francis et al, 2005; Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 2005; Utami, 2005; Francis, Nanda, 
and Olsson, 2008), which also find that earnings quality has negative relationship with cost 
of equity capital.  
Management may be motivated to engage in opportunistic earnings management to 
maximize his/her utility. Investors may have foresee this earnings misreporting and 
consider it as information risk. Less informed investors will perceived higher risk of 
information compared to more informed investor. This higher information risk will 
increase investors’ required rate of return and eventually increase cost of equity capital. 
This study has several limitations as follows: 1) Voluntary disclosure assessment is 
not on the basis of the degree of detail of information disclosed by samples. Firms will get 
the same score if they reveals certain information specified in the instrument, even though 
the degree of detailed of information varies; 2) Earnings quality proxy used in this study is 
limited to accrual quality, earnings variability, absolute abnormal accruals, and the 
common factor [earnings quality]. There are other earnings quality proxies that can be used 
to measure earnings quality such as ERC (Earnings Response Coefficient), earnings 
persistence, earnings smoothing, and timeliness; 3) To estimate cost of equity capital we 
use CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model). According to Botosan (1997), this method has 
weaknesses. Botosan (1997) argues that EBO (Edwards and Bell, Feltham and Ohlson) 
model is better. We do not use this model due to the unavailability of data as input of this 
model. 
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